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scenarios, there is a sense in which the further process of deferred interpretation is not optional, i.e. 
it must be undertaken in order to achieve understanding in the sense of interpreting correctly what 
the speaker intended to communicate.
But it might be questioned why we need the notion of understanding the literal content at all. 
In cases where the literal content and the intended content diverge, there is a strong intuitive pull 
towards not attributing understanding unless the intended content is arrived at. In the cases where 
the literal content and the intended content coincide, understanding could then be explained by the 
same notion of understanding the speaker's intended content.
However,  it  seems that  there  are  cases  where  we particularly need  the  notion  of  literal 
understanding. One way of seeing this is to imagine a scenario in which the hearer has no way of 
accessing what the speaker might have intended with the utterances. For instance, imagine that the 
hearer of (2) only possesses the information that the speaker is Jesse James, but knows nothing 
about James' doings or the traditions pertaining to condemned prisoners. In such a scenario, the 
singular, non-deferred, interpretation of the utterance is the most reasonable one for the hearer to 
opt for. And significantly, it would be wrong to say that in such a scenario the hearer has failed to 
understand the utterance; it is just that she did not have all the information required to realise that 
the speaker had a different communicative intention.
Consequently,  it  seems  that  the  Gricean  premonition  that  our  theory  of  utterance 
interpretation will need both notions of what it is to interpret an utterance correctly is reinforced.
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Who Has My Thoughts?
Michael Hicks, Virginia Commonwealth University
The too many minds problem can be adapted to attack nearly every account of personal identity. 
The problem can be phrased loosely as a question: why do certain things count as people and others 
not? For example, if this human organism is a person, why isn't this brain also a person? It seems to 
be thinking; but I (the organism) insist that I am the person, and the brain is just a part of me. The 
problem also arises as an objection to "perdurantist" theories that maintain that persons persist by 
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having temporal stages as proper parts; the perdurantist maintains that every person is made up of a 
number of different "temporal parts" at  different times,  the maximal combination of which is a 
person. However, there doesn't seem to be any strong reason to deny personhood to every person 
stage, and they seem even more likely to be persons than brains—they can look at themselves in the 
mirror,  scratch  themselves,  pick  their  noses,  and  perform  all  sorts  of  other  actions  typically 
associated  with  persons  that  brains  just  cannot.  While  each  version  of  the  problem attacks  a 
different view, they all rely on the same fundamental intuitions and can be presented by essentially 
the same argument.
In this paper I will canvass a few of the ways in which the argument has and can be applied 
and show how they can all be easily resisted by blocking a central premise.  
Too Many Minds and Animals
The first use of the argument that I will examine is that of Eric Olson (Olson, 105). Olson utilizes 
the argument as an attack on psychological accounts of identity. He begins by pointing out that, 
according  to  the  psychological  approach,  there  are  two  coincident  objects  wherever  there  is  a 
human animal: a psychological continuer and a human organism. At any time, these distinct objects 
have all  and only the same parts.  The difference in these two objects,  according to Olson,  lies 
entirely in their "modal or dispositional properties" (Olson, 105), namely, the human animal has the 
property of possibly continuing to exist without higher brain function, whereas the psychologically 
continuing person could not simultaneously exist and be brain dead. Olson claims that "[o]n the 
psychological approach, a rational, conscious being with the wrong persistence conditions would 
not be a person. But if you and I are not animals, there would seem to be plenty of beings with the 
right psychological features to be persons but the wrong persistence conditions, namely,  human 
animals." (Olson, 106). Olson sees this as a reductio ad absurdum of the psychological approach. 
"There could not be non-people who are exactly like people but for their persistence conditions" 
(Olson, 108). 
So,  Olson's  argument  has  two  premises  and  is  valid  via  modus  tollens:  (1)  if  the 
psychological approach is correct, then there are some things exactly like persons psychologically 
that aren't people, and (2)there are no things exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people. 
Thus, the psychological approach is not correct.
The second premise to Olson’s argument can be seen as an appeal to a sufficiency condition 
for personhood: having complex psychological properties is sufficient for personhood.  This is a 
strongly intuitive principle; it is difficult to see how something could be as psychologically complex 
as a person without being a person.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to give an analysis of 
just what constitutes a complex psychological property, we easily distinguish clear cases of such 
higher-order  thinking  from  clear  cases  of  insufficiently  complex  psychologies:  the  difference 
between a normal human and an eagle, for example.  While this explication is vague, it is precise 
enough for the purposes of this paper.  Hereafter, I will use ‘thought’ to mean the sort of complex 
psychological property sufficient for personhood. 
Two Further Applications of Too Many Minds
Before I consider solutions to this version of the problem, I will give two other applications of it. 
The first is from Shoemaker (Shoemaker, 499-500). Shoemaker points out that Olson's own position 
is vulnerable to a similar attack. Olson claims that persons just are human animals. Shoemaker 
points out that even under Olson's view there is an object coincident with and indistinguishable 
from every person that has different persistence conditions: his "corpse to be." This is an object 
which is coincident with the human animal, apparently shares all of its physical properties, but will 
continue to exist after that animal dies. Apparently the only difference between a person and his 
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corpse-to-be  is  what  Olson  calls  "modal  or  dispositional  properties:"  persistence  conditions. 
Shoemaker claims that if Olson's reasoning is accurate, the corpse-to-be is exactly like a person 
psychologically, and so we can construct an argument logically indistinguishable from Olson's in 
which the first premise reads (1*) if the biological approach is correct, then there are some things 
exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people. According to Shoemaker, this argument is at 
least as strong as Olson's, despite being directly opposed to Olson's view. So, something must be 
wrong here. Shoemaker then offers a solution, which I will briefly discuss later in this paper.
The third application of the too many minds problem (so-called by Shoemaker) that I will 
consider  is  from Trenton  Merrick's  book  Objects  and  Persons.  Merricks  uses  the  problem to 
motivate his position of ontological eliminativism. He sets up the problem explicitly as a paradox 
consisting of four statements:
(1) Within the region filled by atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake) human organismwise, 
there is exactly one conscious entity.
(2) Any object  with  atoms  arranged  (normal,  healthy,  awake,  human)  brainwise  among  its 
proper parts is conscious.
(3) Within the region filled by atoms arranged human organismwise, there is a human organism 
that has atoms arranged brainwise among its proper parts.
(4)  Within the region filled by atoms arranged human organismwise, there is a brain that has 
atoms arranged brainwise among its proper parts.
(Merricks p.49)
Merricks points out that any three of these statements are compatible, but the conjunction of all four 
is a logical contradiction. We must choose to deny at least one. Merricks then argues for three of 
these claims and against the fourth.
Merricks claims that we ought to accept (1). According to Merricks, denying (1) leads to an 
unacceptable  skepticism:  Merricks  and  Olson  agree  that  if  there  are  two  things  thinking  my 
thoughts, it is impossible for me to determine which of them I am. As Olson has it, if only one of 
them is a person, then I cannot through introspection determine that I am a person (I could have the 
wrong  persistence  conditions).  According  to  Merricks,  we  will  also  be  led  to  unacceptable 
uncertainty about the truth of some of our statements, such as "'I am not a mere brain but instead a 
human organism'" (Merricks, 50).
It  is  not clear that  Merricks’ defense of (1) given here works, but only for reasons that 
expose more fundamental difficulties involved in denying (1).  These difficulties arise from the fact 
that uses of self-referring terms are singular.  If there are multiple thinkers of a given thought, then 
singular terms such as ‘I’ fail to refer.  So, if ‘I’ does not refer to anything, then ‘I could not know 
whether I was a mere brain rather than a person’ would be a false sentence, as would any sentence 
that  expresses  an  introspective  report  about  the  thinker  (where  ‘the  thinker’ is  a  definite,  and 
singular, description).  It  is also possible that,  if  (1) does not hold, then there are a plethora of 
thoughts corresponding to each token introspective report—one thought per thinker.  Unfortunately, 
this  is  just  as  conceptually  problematic.   Either  of  these  situations  are  epistemologically  more 
deeply counterintuitive than the one explicated by Merricks and Olson.  They get it right; we ought 
to accept (1).
Merricks also argues that we ought to accept (2): "[d]enying (2) might lead to unwarranted 
skepticism about who, or what, is conscious" (Merricks, 50). I will revisit this defense later in this 
paper.  So, according to Merricks, we are left with (3) and (4). Merricks argues that, because of 
what sort of things we believe persons to be, we ought to accept (3)—that human organisms exist—
but deny that brains exist (4), leaving us with a form of ontological eliminativism in which only 
simples and objects with non-redundant causal powers, such as persons, exist.
Note that there are a number of other ways to apply Merricks' version of the paradox: given 
any (non-dualist1)  account  of personal  identity,  simply find two distinct  objects  that  have what 
1 Some,  but  not  all,  dualist  accounts  of  mind are immune to the problem.  An account  which allows for  objects  
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Merricks calls 'atoms behaving brainwise' among their parts and you have the same conundrum. 
Considering  the  universality  of  the  problem,  no  particular  view  of  personal  identity  seems 
preferable as a response to it.  In the next section I will examine some of these responses, and show 
that they fail.
Initial Solutions
The best options involve attacking the argument on grounds neutral to the various views of personal 
identity. We have three choices: we may accept that there can be multiple objects, only one of which 
is a person, all sharing the same thoughts; we may follow Merricks and reject the existence of any 
objects counting atoms behaving brainwise among their parts other than persons.  Finally, we may 
reject the view that two physically identical objects must be psychologically identical.
Harold Noonan chooses to reject the second premise in Olson's argument, that there are no 
things  exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people, and to deny Merricks' first statement, 
that "[w]ithin the region filled by atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake) human organismwise, 
there is exactly one conscious entity" (Merricks, 50). Noonan first  admits that there are in fact 
plenty of  things  that  share the thoughts  of  any given person and then  attempts  to  assuage the 
counterintuitive situation (Noonan, 209). According to Noonan, we don't realize that we constantly 
have company because of the way our language is formed. This also allows us to resist uncertainty 
regarding statements like "I am not a brain" or "I am a person." Noonan argues that the reference 
rule for 'I' is not that 'I' refers to whatever is using 'I', but instead to the person using 'I.' Noonan does 
not claim that only persons are able to use 'I;' instead he claims that whoever is using 'I' is talking 
about the person using 'I' (Noonan, 210). Recall that on the schema that Noonan endorses, there are 
a number of objects  that  all  have thoughts,  one of which must  be a person.  So,  if  anything is 
thinking a token thought, there is guaranteed to be a person thinking that same thought; Noonan 
believes  that  all  of  the  thoughts  reference  the  person.  Noonan  claims  that  this  fixes  the 
epistemological problem outlined by Olson and Merricks: "I can know that I am a person, since if I 
were the animal and not the person thinking the thought I am currently thinking in thinking I am the 
person, I would still be right" (Noonan, 211). This also allows singular terms to properly refer.
Noonan's  response  fails,  partially  because  it  is  difficult  to  make sense  out  of  Noonan's 
proposal.  Note that  Noonan himself  comes dangerously close to breaking his  own rule  for  the 
reference of 'I' when he claims that "if I were the animal […] I would still be right" (Noonan, 211). 
Depending on how this sentence is meant to be read, he may or may not actually break his rule here; 
if he doesn’t, this statement is very odd: it is a subjunctive conditional in which the antecedent is 
necessarily false.  The natural understanding of this sentence, in which the antecedent is true at 
some  worlds  (and  ‘I’  refers  to  an  animal),  is  not  a  conceptual  possibility  under  Noonan’s 
framework.  This shows that Noonan is making an unjustified claim about the meaning of 'I', which 
he does not sufficiently defend; rather, he merely posits that we accept it to circumvent the paradox. 
In absence of further argumentation, Noonan's response to the argument seems ad hoc, especially 
considering that it does not confront the most fundamental issues of the problem.
Noonan’s response fails to address either of the deeply counterintuitive situations of the too 
many minds paradox: firstly, if the paradox goes through, two distinct objects can share, not just 
qualitatively identical propositional attitudes, but numerically identical thoughts. Noonan's attempt 
to  assuage  our  intuitions  by  explaining  how  all  of  these  statements  will  always  be  true  only 
addresses the surface of the problem. Recall that the heart of the dilemma was never about the truth 
of our statements; our inability to know whether our statements are true or false is merely a way of 
illustrating the absurdity of the consequent: something else is (also) thinking your thoughts.
composed of both mind and body is vulnerable to the attack, as both the mind by itself and the composite object made 
up of the mind and the body together seem to be thinking; however, dualist accounts that deny that the mind and the 
body together make up an object get around this difficulty.
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Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  Noonan  does  not  recognize  any sort  of  psychological 
complexity  as  being  sufficient  for  personhood.   The  intuition  that  psychological  complexity  is 
logically linked to personhood underlies Olson’s second premise.  It has strong intuitive backing 
and supports, not just Olson’s biological view, but also most psychological accounts of identity 
across time.  To these accounts, the person just is whatever is thinking the right thoughts.  If Noonan 
denies this principle, he ought to provide some strong argumentation, which he does not.
So, we should accept that only one thing is thinking our thoughts, and that there are no 
things that have psychological properties indistinguishable from those of persons that fail  to be 
persons. This rules Noonan out, and leaves us with a few options: first, we can follow Merricks' line 
and embrace ontological eliminativism, or we can deny that  all  physically identical  objects  are 
psychologically identical.
Here we should not commit ourselves to Merricks’ stark ontology.  The intuitive backing for 
the existence of non-person objects complex objects is clearly stronger than the support for the 
claim that (as Merricks puts it) "Any object with atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake, human) 
brainwise among its proper parts is conscious" (Merricks, p. 49). Merricks presents his solution to 
the problem of too many minds as motivation for ontological eliminativism rather than as a knock-
down argument for it. His main argument for his view comes later. So, Merricks denies that there 
are non-person objects for reasons independent of the too many minds problem. If we are going to 
follow him in ontological eliminativism, we should likewise do so for independent reasons, and be 
thankful that we do not have to worry about the problem of too many minds. If, however, we are not 
already eliminativists, we should not deny the existence of non-person animals for the sake of this 
paradox.
The Proposal: Brains Don’t Think
This  leaves  us  with one  option:  denying  that  all  objects  with  functioning  brains  as  parts  have 
thoughts and psychological properties. In other words, we ought to deny Olson's claim that the 
human animal is "psychologically identical" to the person, despite being physically identical at a 
microscopic level. This at first seems ad hoc—aren't we just denying thoughts to animals and brains 
simply to circumvent Olson’s argument?
Let us first examine the support that Olson and Merricks present to support the claim that all 
intrinsically physically identical objects are psychologically identical. Merricks supports his second 
claim (2) just by pointing out that "denying (2) might lead to unwarranted skepticism about who, or 
what, is conscious" (Merricks, 50) and challenging whomever denies (2) to "offer a replacement 
that would explain why atoms arranged brainwise, for some kinds of things (like me) is connected 
to consciousness, but not for other kinds of things (like my brain)" (Merricks, p. 51).  
Olson supports his premise by giving a thought experiment according to which you are put 
into a replication machine. The machine does not destroy you; however, it does create an object 
physically identical to you a few feet away from you. Olson notes that, because the new object is 
physically identical to you, we believe that it  is a person. He then notes that the only physical 
difference between this object and you is relational: it  is a difference of a few feet.  A few feet 
couldn't make prevent something from having psychological properties, so our intuitions stipulate 
that we can know that an object is conscious based only on its nonrelational microphysical features. 
So, he thinks, if this object is conscious, it  looks like the human animal coincident with you is 
conscious--after all, it has the same microphysical features as your duplicate.
Here  Olson’s  example  shows that  relational  properties  cannot  make  a  difference  in  the 
psychology of two otherwise indistinguishable beings. This is, of course, a few steps away from 
showing that only microphysical features can make a psychological difference between two objects; 
presumably, you and your duplicate have the same modal and dispositional properties, even those 
that are not microphysical.  But it does lend some intuitive support to the notion that really only the 
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microphysical is relevant.
Olson then examines various reasons to believe that two physically indistinguishable objects 
could be psychologically distinct. He considers the view that, because psychological properties are 
emergent properties,  it  should  not  be  so  surprising  that  two  physically  identical  beings  have 
different  psychological  properties.  After  all,  the  psychological  properties  are  distinct  from the 
physical  properties.  Olson  rejects  this  view,  saying,  "things  cannot  have  different  emergent 
properties unless there is some underlying intrinsic difference between those things" (Olson, 101). 
Olson then uses the example of fragility,  which is a property emergent from the microphysical 
features  of  the  object,  to  support  his  claim  that  there  must  be  some  physical  difference  to 
correspond to the difference in emergent properties.
While Olson does not explicitly explicate the concept of emergence here, I will take it to be 
something along the lines of supervenience (for Olson, it actually has to be a bit more, as I’ll show 
later). A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if, for any change in A-properties there 
also is a change in B-properties. In this case, the A-properties are said to be supervenient and the B-
properties said to be the  supervenience base. To use Olson’s example, fragility is a property that 
supervenes on microphysical structural properties; hence two microphysically identical objects are 
identical with respect to fragility.
There  are  a  few  distinct  types  of  supervenience  relevant  to  the  relationship  between 
psychological and physical properties (here I use ‘mental’ and ‘psychological’ interchangeably). A-
properties can supervene individually on B-properties: that is, any two individuals (or objects) with 
distinct  A-properties  must  have  distinct  B-properties.   Secondly,  A-properties  can  supervene 
globally on B-properties: that is, any two situations (or possible worlds) with distinct A properties 
must  have  distinct  B  properties.  In  order  for  Olson’s  argument  to  be  cogent,  psychological 
properties  must  be  individually  supervenient  only  on  microphysical  properties;  macrophysical 
modal or dispositional properties, as he calls them, must not be part of the individual supervenience 
base (B-properties) (Chalmers, 33, and Kim, 158). Hereafter I’ll use ‘modal properties’ to mean the 
sort of macrophysical modal properties disallowed by Olson’s argument.
It may seem that his argument will be easily resisted by the property dualist, who believes 
that  there is no logical connection between the physical  and mental properties expressed, while 
there is a clear logical connection between microphysical properties and fragility. However, Olson’s 
use of “emergence” is sufficiently vague to be compatible with the view that mental  properties 
supervene only naturally, and not logically, on physical properties: in other words, that the mental 
properties are linked to physical properties by contingent laws rather than logical relations. Many 
property dualists accept that such connections exist: David Chalmers explicitly endorses this thesis 
(Chalmers, 124); even Donald Davidson admits that a form of supervenience is compatible with his 
view (Davidson, 250). Of course, for those that do not, there doesn’t seem to be any reason to 
accept Olson’s claim of dependence.
Under  any materialist  framework,  the  existence  of  psychological  properties  is  logically 
implied  by  the  existence  of  certain  physical  or  functional  properties:  at  the  very  least  these 
psychological properties  logically supervene on physical properties. Of course, many materialists 
claim that the relationship between psychological and physical properties is stronger: namely, that 
psychological properties are identical with physical properties of some stripe. As the explication I 
have given of supervenience implies that the supervenience relation is reflexive, these views are 
captured by this weaker principle; every property supervenes on itself.
Under the property dualist framework, the existence of psychological properties is implied 
by the existence of physical or functional properties together with some additional psycho-physical 
laws: mental properties naturally supervene on physical properties. Olson’s argument hangs on the 
assumption that this supervenience relation is individual supervenience on intrinsic properties. But 
even  completely  ordinary  physical  properties,  if  sufficiently  complex,  are  not individually 
supervenient on microphysical properties! Consider the following example:
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Imagine that every member of VCU’s Philosophy Club was also a member of the VCU 
basketball team.  Here we would have two objects that were microphysically identical, with the 
principal  difference between them being their  persistence conditions:  the basketball  team could 
survive a cut of funding to the philosophy club that the club could not survive, and the philosophy 
club could survive the dissolution of the team, whereas the team couldn’t.  Now, the property of 
scoring  points  is  the  poster  child  of  a  complex  property  that  is  dependent  on  microphysical 
properties:  something  physical  must  be  different  between  two  situations  in  which  a  team has 
different points values.  Imagine that the basketball team had 82 points. While the philosophy club 
would be microphysically identical to the basketball team (by being made of exactly the same parts 
as the basketball team), the philosophy club would not have 82 points.  So, while scoring points 
clearly globally  supervenes on microphysical properties, and while the philosophy club is a system 
microphysically  identical  to  the  basketball  team,  the  philosophy  club  does  not  instantiate  the 
property of having scored 82 points, while the basketball team does.  But the basketball team and 
the philosophy club are microphysically identical; the difference between them in virtue of which 
many  of  these  ordinary  properties  apply  or  fail  to  apply  is  what  Olson  calls  “modal  or 
dispositional.”
So, the modal and dispositional properties of microphysically identical objects are relevant 
to the instantiation of particularly complicated supervenient properties. In other words, complicated 
physical  properties  supervene  individually  on  modal  properties  in  addition  to  the  non-modal 
microphysical  properties.  But  of  course,  the relationship  between psychological  and underlying 
physical  properties  is  considerably more complex  than  the  relationship  between points  and the 
properties  of  basketball  teams.  So  if  Olson’s  claim is  that  psychological  properties  supervene 
individually on non-modal microphysical properties, it needs further support.
However, this does not show that psychological properties do not individually supervene 
only on non-modal microphysical properties, or that not everything that has the relevant physical 
properties has the relevant psychological properties. Right now, the defender of the two many minds 
argument is at an impasse; his argument is no longer entirely convincing, but neither is it decisively 
refuted.  I will now show that there are good reasons to deny that this relationship holds between 
psychological and non-modal physical properties.
There are a number of ways to motivate the view that not all physically identical things are 
psychologically identical, many of which are specific to particular views in philosophy of mind. 
Shoemaker, for example, claims that a proper understanding of functionalism compels one to deny 
thoughts to certain objects. However, even if you do not agree with Shoemaker's functionalism, you 
ought to accept his conclusion.
Recall that one of the supports of the too many minds paradox was this: having complex 
thoughts is sufficient for personhood.  This just means that everything that has thoughts is a person. 
But  that  is  logically  equivalent  to  the  statement  “anything  that’s  not  a  person  doesn’t  have 
thoughts.” So, being a person is a necessary condition for having thoughts.  
And if that’s true, then those defending against the various incarnations of this argument 
have independent reasons to deny thoughts to person-stages, brains, or corpses-to-be: they aren’t 
people.  Of course, they will have to give some additional explanation of why they aren’t people, 
but this explanation will surely be non-empty and vary with the account of personhood and personal 
identity: different views will give different reasons, but none of these reasons will be “brains don’t 
have thoughts.” Any view of personal identity will have some reason that I, and not my brain, is a 
person (unless, of course, according to that view I  am my brain); even Merricks finds interesting 
reasons to count humans as persons and deny existence to brains, rather than vice versa. The point 
here is that that additional explanation, whatever it is, is enough reason to deny thoughts to person-
stages,  brains,  or  anything else,  even if  it  involves modal  and dispositional  properties.   If  that 
explanation is lacking, it had better be lacking for reasons other than this.
Recall that Merricks defends his central second claim by challenging its denier to "offer a 
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replacement that would explain why atoms arranged brainwise, for some kinds of things (like me) is 
connected to consciousness, but not for other kinds of things (like my brain)" (Merricks, p. 51).  
This can easily be done by any account of personal identity:  we just build in to the connection 
between the arrangement of the atoms and the possession of mental properties the criteria for being 
the unique experiencer of those properties. Establishing these criteria is closely related to the project 
of personal identity, and while stances on the problems in personal identity do not always imply 
particular  criteria  for  personhood,  they  frequently  narrow  the  candidate  range.  For  example, 
perdurantist theories of personal identity rule out person stages as persons; psychological continuity 
theories rule out human animals2.
The  paradox  of  the  too  many  minds  is  going  after  the  problem  of  personhood  and 
consciousness from the wrong direction. Given a set of numerically distinct objects, a set of token 
thoughts, in the case that all of the objects contain the systems from which the thoughts emerge, we 
ought not immediately assume that the thoughts belong to all of the objects. Instead, we should 
examine the differences between the objects and then decide which one is the person and has the 
psychological properties. In most cases, this can be done non-arbitrarily: recall that some of the 
objects can survive brain transplants whereas some can't, and some are able to look at themselves in 
the mirror while some of them aren't.  Perhaps there are some cases in which multiple candidate 
thinkers are equally well suited to carry the thoughts; in these cases, it will be arbitrary which one 
thinks3.  
Four-Dimensionalism and Objections
Thus far I have assumed that this reply is compatible, and palatable, to all accounts of personal 
identity. This is not obvious: I claim that only persons, and not person-stages, have thoughts. This 
may seem anathematic to four-dimensionalist projects which seek to eliminate persons in favor of 
person stages. The idea that only persons (and not person-stages) have thoughts is no more of a 
threat to the reduction of persons to person-stages than the claim that only basketball teams (and not 
basketball players) have points is a threat to the reduction of basketball teams to basketball players. 
It is still clear that the team has its points in virtue of the properties of its players, even though the 
players themselves do not have any points. This view requires a modification of four-dimensionalist 
theories, but the modification is syntactical.
My argument does show that the relationship that holds between person-stages and makes 
some accumulation of stages a person, rather than some other, cannot be defined in terms of their 
thoughts, any more than the relationship between basketball players that bonds them into a team 
(let’s call it the B-relation) can be defined in terms of the points of the members. Interestingly, the 
B-relation  could  be spelled out in terms of into which basket the players put the ball (with,  of 
course, a few other details filled in). Similarly, the relationship between person-stages could easily 
be defined in  terms of lower-level  properties  which do not  have the disturbing implications  of 
thoughts but retain the significant features.
So here’s the idea: according to Olson, and according to many naïve notions of thoughts, the 
individual  supervenience  base  for  psychological  properties  does  not  include  the  modal  or 
dispositional properties that make someone a person. I have argued that the base does include these 
properties, and that properly, thoughts only apply to people. I propose that the properties that link 
person-stages  into  a  person supervene  merely on  those  lower-level  properties  that  don’t  imply 
personhood—the ones that Olson thinks make up thoughts all by themselves.
2 So, on a perdurantist view, four-dimensional maximality is a criterion for personhood, and therefore (on the current 
view) a criterion for having thoughts.  Similarly, on a psychological view, not possibly existing without higher order 
brain function is a criterion for personhood, and so a criterion for having thoughts.
3 Like Noonan’s response,  this view solves the problem syntactically.   However,  this solution is  superior  for  two 
reasons: firstly, it  saves the intuitive definition of ‘I’, which Noonan ignores; and secondly,  it preserves the logical 
implication from psychological complexity to personhood, and from personhood to psychological complexity.
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This move to lower-level properties that have fewer logical connections should not be seen 
as a new or disturbing change in four-dimensionalist theories of persistence.  Recall that person-
stages cannot have all sorts of important psychological properties anyhow, such as remembering 
where they were three years ago, or correctly believing that they will be at work at such-and-such a 
time next week.  Instead, many of these properties are already implicitly understood as lower level 
properties, even though memories are the only ones to have been explicitly redefined this way.  The 
poster child of this kind of logically restricted property is the quasi-memory.  ‘Quasi-thoughts,’ or 
properties that are explicitly defined to not imply personhood, should be no more threatening to a 
four-dimensionalist theory than quasi-memories, which explicitly do not imply identity.  Although 
many refined definitions of quasi-thoughts would allow these views to bypass the too many minds 
paradox,  the  simplest  would  define  quasi-thoughts  as  being  psychological  properties  which 
supervene only on the non-modal properties in the supervenience base of thoughts. 
We should accept this schema because it most accurately reflects our intuitions regarding 
personhood and consciousness, and because neither Olson nor Merricks have offered compelling 
argumentation to deny it. Shoemaker gives a similar claim, and motivates it via functionalism, but 
we can deny the problem of the too many minds even if we don't accept Shoemaker's functionalist 
account of the mind.
So,  regardless  of  our  beliefs  regarding  personal  identity,  survival,  and  personhood  in 
general, we can and should resist the problem of too many minds by restricting the ownership of 
psychological properties to persons only.
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Is It Reasonable For ‘Art’ To Have No 
Definition?
John Fluharty
The concept ‘art’ has no definition. It is open to interpretation and change; what is constituted as 
art is based on a range of rational reasons, contextually different between individuals and situations. 
I will show that Wittgenstein’s theories about aesthetics (different from family resemblances) were 
on the right path, and that Morris Weitz’s open concept view was flawed, but can be revived by 
cluster accounts, such as Berys Gaut’s. However, I will also show that Gaut was mistaken to give 
set criteria that constitute a highly disjunctive concept (definition) of art, but that rational reasons in 
an  epistemic  field  can  provide  individual  concepts  of  art,  allowing  for  an  explanation  to  the 
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